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ARTICLE 
The WTO Agreements and the Regulation  
of Energy Markets: Is There a Good FiT? 
 
RAVI SOOPRAMANIEN* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A FiT regulation is a form of price regulation, in which 
government entities pay energy producers (generators) a fixed or 
premium rate for electricity, determined up front on the basis of 
costs and profit expectations, for a fixed period, usually of between 
15-25 years.1 FiT regulations obviate the need for a power 
purchase agreement (PPA) with qualifying generators.2 Such 
generators are typically paid the published FiT rates irrespective 
of how much energy they can actually generate.3 RPS and EA 
regulations, in contrast, are both forms of quantity regulation. In 
a RPS regulation, private (retail) buyers are required to purchase 
a specified amount (a percentage) of electricity from renewable 
 
* Ravi Soopramanien is an attorney-at-law. He previously served as a Legal 
Officer at both the African Development Bank’s Energy Department, and the 
World Trade Organization’s Rules Division. 
1. Toby Couture et al., A Policymaker’s Guide to Feed-in Tariff Policy Design 
72 (NREL Technical Report NREL/TP-6A2-44849, 2010), http://www. 
nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/44849.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8E6-U3ZK]. 
2. Id. 
3. These prices sometimes allow some flexibility for the government 
purchaser to vary the price over time. See JOEL B. EISEN ET AL., ENERGY, 
ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND MATERIAL 751-53 (4th ed. 2015). 
1
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energy (RE) sources.4 Compliance with a RPS regulation is 
monitored through the exchange of Renewable Energy Credits 
(RECs), which measure the generation and environmental 
attributes of the RE source.5 RECs are usually tradable.6 A RPS 
regulation may compel a retail buyer to negotiate a PPA with a 
qualifying generator.7 However, such retailer may choose to 
comply by purchasing RECs, or paying penalties instead for non-
compliance.8 An EA regulation is something of a hybrid, used by 
developing countries where the government is the dominant 
purchaser of electricity.9 To generate more value for money than 
possible under a FiT regulation, the government in question 
invites competitive solicitations from qualifying generators 
seeking to provide electricity generation, under a PPA, on the basis 
of capacity for a fixed duration.10 
Before discussing these regulations further, it is useful to 
recall that the energy narrative is one inextricably linked with the 
development of public international law over the past century. The 
creation of the continental shelf regime, which kick-started the 
development of the law of the sea, was driven by offshore 
exploitation of oil and gas reserves.11 Expropriation, one of the 
earliest customary international law norms to emerge under the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice,12 developed largely 
 
4. C.G. Dong, Feed-In Tariff vs. Renewable Portfolio Standard: An Empirical 
Test of Their Relative Effectiveness in Promoting Wind Capacity Development, 42 
ENERGY POL’Y 476 (2012). 
5. KARLYNN CORY ET. AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., FEED-IN TARIFF 
POLICY: DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, AND RPS POLICY INTERACTIONS 8-12 (2009), 
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy09osti/45549.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8JT-F4CR]. 
6. See What Are Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs)?, BONNEVILLE ENVTL 
FOUND., http://www.b-e-f.org/learn/what-are-renewable-energy-certificates  
[https://perma.cc/U5LV-FR62]. 
7. See EISEN, supra note 3, at 758-65. 
8. Id. 
9. LUIZ T. A. MAURER & LUIZ A. BARROSO, ELECTRICITY AUCTIONS: AN 
OVERVIEW OF EFFICIENT PRACTICES 77-90 (2011), https://openknowledge. 
worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2346/638750PUB0Exto00Box0361531B0
PUBLIC0.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/G3UJ-F74Z]. 
10. Id. 
11. Thomas Cottier, Renewable Energy and WTO Law: More Policy Space or 
Enhanced Disciplines?, 5 RENEWABLE ENERGY L. & POL’Y REV. 40, 41 (2014). 
12. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 
59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/2
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in the context of disciplining the nationalizations of energy 
infrastructure, and stabilizing energy-related concessions granted 
to foreign investors. The United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and its various accords and 
protocols, have all sought to curb states’ use of fossil fuel based 
energy sources.13 In the absence of a dedicated multilateral energy 
organization, a global patchwork of energy regulation has been 
split between the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), the Energy Charter (ECT), the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the WTO.14 This paper focuses 
on the role of the WTO in global energy regulation. The WTO, 
through its various Agreements, sets binding disciplines on the 
cross-border trade in goods and services among WTO Member 
countries. With 164 Members in its ranks, and Iran and Algeria as 
the only two non-Members of note,15 it can be said that the WTO, 
directly or indirectly, influences the modalities of global trade in 
goods and services.  
RE disputes are growing steadily in the WTO. In order to 
understand how WTO jurisprudence affects the problem, it is 
useful to classify cases in two waves that followed a period marked 
by what some scholars characterize loosely as the RE armistice.16 
The first wave, prompted by low-cost Asian RE equipment, 
featured challenges to, or alleged reprisals against trade remedy 
measures imposed by the United States on, Indian and Chinese 
solar and wind RE electricity generating equipment. 17 The second 
 
13. See Cottier, supra note 11. 
14. The International Energy Agency linked with the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) also bears mentioning. In 
recent years, it has grown into the world’s default research forum on energy 
matters. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, https://www.iea.org [https://perma.cc/HW2D-
ZFAT]. 
15. Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG. (July 26, 2016), https:// 
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm [https://perma.cc/V7Y2 
-GUNV]. 
16. Luca Rubini, Ain’t Wastin’ Time No More: Subsidies for Renewable 
Energy, The SCM Agreement, Policy Space, and Law Reform, 15(2) J. INT’L ECON. 
L. 525, 555-58 (2012). 
17. Appellate Body Report, United States–Countervailing Duty Measures on 
Certain Products from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/AB/R (adopted Jan. 16, 2015), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/437abr_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/MU 
9G-L9BB]; Appellate Body Report, United States–Countervailing and Anti-
Dumping Measures on Certain Products from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS449/AB/R 
3
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wave of disputes has, more or less, flipped the script, as Asian 
states in turn are challenging local content rules and feed-in-tariffs 
maintained by developed states.18  
This paper focuses on this second wave of WTO RE disputes. 
It will assess whether or to what extent policy instruments 
requiring increased use of RE in national electricity grids, notably 
FiT, RPS and EA regulations, are consistent with WTO legal 
obligations. Part II of this paper will discuss energy markets, and 
the issues that are presented through incorporation of RE into 
national grids. Part III will shift focus to the WTO. It will introduce 
the WTO and relevant WTO law, with a particular emphasis on 
the Appellate Body’s conclusion in its Canada – RE/FiT report. 
Part IV will assess whether or to what extent WTO Member States 
can enact FiT, RPS and EA regulations without fear of possible 
WTO litigation. Part V will conclude with recommendations.  
 
(adopted July 22, 2014), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/449abr_e. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZDQ-T8PP]; Appellate Body Report, China–Countervailing 
and Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the 
United States, ¶ 6251, WTO Doc. WT/DS414/AB/R (adopted Oct. 18, 2012), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/414abr_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5 
WW-TSLP]; Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS419, China–Measures Concerning 
Wind Power Equipment, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds419_e.htm [https://perma.cc/8ANB-D5VX] (in 
consultation on December 22, 2010; amicably settled). 
18. Appellate Body Reports, Canada–Certain Measures Affecting the 
Renewable Energy Generation Sector, Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in 
Tariff Program, ¶ 7, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/AB/R, WT/DS426/AB/R, (adopted May 
24, 2013), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/412_426abr_a_e. pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q4GV-L7XY] [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, Canada – 
Renewables/FiT]; Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS452, European Union and 
Certain Member States—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy 
Generation Sector, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
dispu_e/cases_e/ds452_e.htm [https://perma.cc/6KG2-VTED] (in consultation on 
November 5, 2012; panel request pending). Bucking the trend, the United States 
successfully challenged India’s use of local content requirements in its solar 
industry. See Panel Report, India–Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and 
Solar Modules, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/R (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/456r_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9GB-JPUH]. India 
reportedly threatened to request consultations in relation to analogous United 
States practice. See Tom Miles, India Questions U.S. Green Energy Incentives at 
WTO, REUTERS, (Apr. 17, 2013, 4:53 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ahh-
india-usa-trade-idUSL5N0D44K1 20130417 [https://perma.cc/H4BE-6CXU]. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/2
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II. THE ENERGY MARKET 
A. Electricity 
Electricity production is organized around four features that 
make electricity a unique commodity.19 All energy grids must 
accommodate these features in order to function properly. First, 
electricity cannot be practically stored.20 It must be generated, as 
it is needed.21 Managing electricity output to handle changes in 
demand (load), accordingly, present logistical challenges. The 
result is that the wholesale price of electricity can vary 
considerably in the course of a day. Second, electricity takes the 
path of least resistance.22 This means that there is no defined path 
for electricity delivery: customers cannot choose the electricity that 
they want. Indeed, every kilowatt-hour (kWh) of electricity 
consumed by a customer is physically identical.23 It bears 
mentioning, in this regard, that customers, inasmuch as they 
purchase so-called “green” energy tariffs, are not purchasing the 
direct distribution of RE-generated electricity into their homes. 
Rather, they are usually paying for their energy supplier to invest 
 
19. SALLY HUNT, MAKING COMPETITION WORK IN ELECTRICITY 30-32 (2002). 
20. Id. at 30. 
21. Pumped hydro is sometimes referred to as a form of electricity storage. 
Id. at 30 n.11. However, what is “stored” is not electricity, but water, which is 
saved for use in peak hours. Id. This water is propelled through a turbine-
generator to create electricity. Id. The past few years has seen innovations in 
storage – not least of which Tesla Motor’s 6.4 kWh Powerwall units. See Seth 
Weintraub, Tesla Begins Alerting 1st General US Powerwall Customers, 
Installations Starting in June, ELEKTREK (Apr. 8, 2016), http://electrek.co/2016/ 
04/08/tesla-begins-alerting-1st-general-us-powerwall-customers-installations-
starting-in-june [https://perma.cc/4ATL-2ZF8]. However, such innovations have 
yet to reach scale – Tesla reportedly scrapped plans to introduce a more powerful 
10 kWh unit, as “the economics didn’t work”, and is rolling out the Powerwall on 
a limited basis in June 2014 to owners of Tesla vehicles. Id. The 6.4 kWh unit is 
scheduled to retail for $3000 a pop, once it is released. Id. 
22. See HUNT, supra note 19, at 30-31. 
23. William Hogan, Overview of the Electricity System in the Province of 
Ontario (December 11, 2011), at 2, submitted as Exhibit CDA-2 in Panel Reports, 
Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector / 
Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, WTO Docs. 
WT/DS412/R, WT/DS426/R (adopted 24 May 2013, as modified by Appellate Body 
Reports WT/DS412/AB/R and WT/DS426/AB/R), https://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/dispu_e/412_426abr_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/CH84-JH92] [hereinafter 
Panel Report, Canada – Renewables/FiT]. 
5
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in producing more RE energy, or carbon offsets. Third, the grid is 
interconnected: the introduction of transmission lines in one part 
of the grid can impact flows elsewhere, and may even destroy 
capacity on a grid.24 The interconnected nature of the grid makes 
it particularly vulnerable to external events, such as the sudden 
loss of output at a generation plant or a dramatic (and 
instantaneous) change in consumer consumption.25 Fourth, 
electricity travels at the speed of light.26 If the precise supply of 
electricity fails to meet demand at any given moment, the 
frequency falls and, if many loads fail, this can lead to a blackout.27 
The grid, accordingly, must be managed by a single system 
operator capable of calling on generators to raise or lower supply 
to meet changes in loads in a matter of seconds.28  
B. Electricity Markets 
Since its commercialization in the late 19th century, electricity 
was vertically integrated, and operated either by the state, or by 
private operators as public utilities, a form of regulated 
monopoly.29 Electricity markets proved resilient to competitive 
regulation because, broadly speaking, regulators simply could not 
fathom of any other way the industry could function: in addition to 
the importance of having one system operator, all three traditional 
functions of the industry, namely generation, transmission and 
distribution, contained elements of a natural monopoly.30 At the 
time, conventional wisdom dictated that there were potentially 
infinite economies of scale to generation. This turned out to be 
false: scale economies from generation are all captured at some 
point.31 Even so, logistical and regulatory advantages remained to 
siting generators next to each other.32 It remains the case, 
 
24. See HUNT, supra note 19, at 31-32. 
25. Id. at 32. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. See HUNT, supra note 19, at 24-26. 
30. Id. at 37-38. 
31. Nuclear reactors for instance cap out at 1 GW, whereas coal and gas 
plants typically cap out at 650 MW. Id. at 26-27. 
32. See EISEN, supra note 3, at 60-70. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/2
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furthermore, that there are economies of scale in transmission and 
distribution, reinforced by the visual and siting impracticalities of 
constructing competing transmission and distribution cables.  
In the United States, electricity was managed, for the most 
part, by investor-owned utilities (IOUs). These were granted 
monopoly franchises to provide electricity to specified geographical 
areas. To proscribe utilities’ abilities to extract monopoly rents, 
regulators in the United States set rates based on the cost of 
service (rate-basing). These rates, which formed the basis of 
countless litigation over the past two centuries, covered utilities’ 
fixed and variable costs, plus utilities’ cost of capital, including a 
reasonable rate of return for its investors.33 Many countries 
emulated important elements of the United States’ regulated 
monopoly model.34  
Outside the United States, for reasons of geography and the 
importance of providing residents universal access to power, states 
generally opted for a more centralized model, where the state 
monopolized the electricity market. The United Kingdom had 
centralized the provision of electricity services from the outset.35 
This model was effectively exported to its colonies abroad. Under 
 
33. Rate-basing was summarized as follows by the DC Circuit Court in Jersey 
Cent. Power & Light Co. v FERC: “[t]he utility business represents a compact of 
sorts; a monopoly on service in a particular geographical area is grated to the 
utility in exchange for a regime of intensive regulation, including price regulation 
quite alien to the free market. . . Each party to the compact gets something in the 
bargain. . . utility investors are provided a level of stability in earnings and value 
less likely to be attained in the unregulated or moderately regulated sector in 
turn, ratepayers are afforded universal, non-discriminatory service and 
protection from monopolistic profits through political control over an economic 
enterprise. Whether this regime is wise or not is, needless to say, not before us.” 
Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v FERC, 810 F.2d 1168, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(Starr, J., concurring). For a critical account of how operators could conspire to 
game the system at the expense of ratepayers, see ALFRED E. KAHN, THE 
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 20-57 (1988). 
34. Hong Kong is one of the few that did. See THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
POWER SECTOR REFORM: THE EXPERIENCE OF FIVE MAJOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
2 (David Victor & Thomas Heller eds., 2009). 
35. This should be put into perspective, however. Up until a few years ago, 
China was essentially adding capacity of 80-90 GW of electricity – roughly 
equivalent to the United Kingdom grid. See Mayur Sontakke, Must-Know: China’s 
Additions to its Power Generation Capacity, MARKET REALIST (Oct. 1, 2014, 12:19 
PM), http://marketrealist.com/2014/10/must-know-chinas-additions-power-gene 
ration-capacity [https://perma.cc/V8BM-ERX5]. 
7
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Margaret Thatcher, however, the United Kingdom led the charge 
in transitioning to a market-based approach.36 It did so by 
unbundling generation into various competitive generators, and 
splitting distribution between 12 companies, each serving a 
specified geographical area.37 Generators and distributors were 
required to trade power through contract, or submit bids through 
a common pool.38 The United Kingdom experiment saw rates fall 
drastically, prompting a global shift towards more market-based 
solutions to national electricity markets.39 The United Kingdom 
experiment also had profound implications for Commonwealth 
nations such as Canada, which had followed elements of the 
United States model into the 20th Century before developing large 
vertically integrated state-controlled entities akin to those in the 
United Kingdom (pre-deregulatory) model.40  
The United Kingdom experiment inspired states throughout 
the world to experiment with competition in electricity markets.41 
Even the United States embraced competition, empowering the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to allow market-
based rates in certain instances.42 FERC Orders 888 and 889, in 
turn, dramatically altered United States electricity markets. Order 
888 mandated the unbundling of electricity and the separation of 
marketing functions for these newly-disaggregated services; 
required utilities to provide open access to their energy tariffs; and 
 
36. See EARL REITAN, THE THATCHER REVOLUTION: MARGARET THATCHER, 
JOHN MAJOR, TONY BLAIR, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF MODERN BRITAIN, 1979 – 
2001, at 79-80 (2002). 
37. Id. 
38. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRICITY REFORM 
ABROAD AND U.S. INVESTMENT 16 (1997), http://www.abraceel.com.br/_anexos/ 
electricity_reforms_abroad.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CNV-AFV7]. 
39. See VICTOR & HELLER, supra note 34, at 5. 
40. INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF ELECTRICITY REGULATION 377-81 
(Richard J. Gilbert & Edward P. Kahn eds., 1996). 
41. For developing countries, these experiments have largely been 
unsuccessful. See VICTOR & HELLER, supra note 34, at 254-306. 
42. Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824(d), authorizes 
FERC to set market-based rates to power marketers that can demonstrate a lack 
of market power. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824(d) (2012). It is noted in the 
literature that the United States is constrained from following the United 
Kingdom model owing notably to the fact that the United States grid was 
developed largely by private industry. See HUNT, supra note 19, at 264. The 
United Kingdom faced fewer conflicts of interests in transitioning to a competitive 
market owing to its prior ownership of the English grid. Id. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/2
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allowed existing utilities who had incurred sunk costs relying on 
older regulations to recover their stranded costs.43 Order 889 
proscribed utilities from sharing market information in any way 
that would prevent access to this information by potential 
competitors, and required all such information to be posted on the 
Open Access Same-Time Information System (OASIS).44 
Outside of the United Kingdom and the United States, the 
push towards what the literature refers to as the “standard 
textbook model of reform”45 has, empirically, failed to yield many 
success stories to date.46 Instead of pure competition, the 
equilibrium reached in some major emerging economies that 
transitioned to competitive markets has been likened to a “dual 
market” system, in which solvent investor-owned and insolvent 
state-owned utilities coexist, buoyed by a mix of laissez faire 
accountancy rules, subsidies, soft loans and other forms of “special 
payment and financing arrangements.”47 There is, accordingly, 
extensive government intervention in even those electricity 
markets that have ostensibly transitioned to competition. This is 
because of the various public interest needs to be met in the 
provision of electricity.48 One such public interest need faced by 
modern electricity concerns the challenge of incorporating an 
increased supply of RE-generated energy as a response to climate 
change. A given grid’s electricity supply mix is determined by a 
range of factors, the most important of which being capital costs, 
access to fuel and fuel costs, population density, transmission 
access to population centers, geography, climate, grid reliability, 
and, increasingly, policy decisions about acceptable environmental 
impacts.49 A given supply mix in today’s national grids reflects two 
 
43. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded 
Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 
1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. § 35 and 18 C.F.R. § 385). 
44. Open Access Same-Time Information System (Formerly Real-Time 
Information Networks) and Standards of Conduct, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,737 (May 10, 
1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. § 37). 
45. See VICTOR & HELLER, supra note 34, at 21. 
46. Id. at 18 (discussing Chile’s transition to a competitive system). 
47. Id. at 289. 
48. Id. at 173 (discussing the Indian market, and the importance of universal 
access). 
49. See Hogan, supra note 23, at 3. 
9
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sets of trade-offs, between providing electricity at a low cost, and 
maintaining grid reliability; and balancing fossil fuel generation 
with RE technologies.50 It follows that not all generators are the 
same. They can be split into base, intermediate, peak, and RE 
services.51  
Taking Ontario as an example, base load generators, mainly 
nuclear and hydro plants,52 operate between 50-80% of the time in 
a given year.53 Such plants, which can also include coal-fired 
thermal generators, have high capital costs, and low fuel costs.54 
They take a while to power up, but once activated they can operate 
at constant levels. The output of base load generators cannot be 
changed rapidly to accommodate sudden changes in load.55 
Intermediate load generators supply electricity when demand is 
above minimum levels, but has not yet reached peak.56 These 
plants, which include gas-fired steam-cycle, combustion turbine 
and combined cycle generators, operate anywhere between 15-50% 
of the time in a given year.57 Such plants have capital costs 
comparatively lower than base load generators, but variable 
(mostly fuel) costs follow the price of natural gas, and tend – until 
recently – to be high.58 Peak load generators, notably single cycle 
gas-fired turbines, internal combustion engine and pumped hydro 
 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Falling gas prices are increasingly allowing for gas-fired plants to serve 
as base load generators. JOSEPH CULLENT & ERIN MANSUR, INFERRING CARBON 
ABATEMENT COSTS IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS: A REVEALED PREFERENCE APPROACH 
USING THE SHALE REVOLUTION 5 (2016), https://www.dartmouth.edu/~mansur/ 
papers/cullen_mansur_gasprices.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SEH-W67E]. They are 
not hampered by the slow start-up times mentioned above in relation to coal and 
nuclear plants. Id. 
53. See Hogan, supra note 23. 
54. Id. at 3-4. For hydro generators, all direct costs are capital costs, as they 
produce electricity from the energy of flowing water. Id. at 4. Variable costs for 
coal-fired plants include the cost of fuel (coal). Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 5. 
57. Id. 
58. See, Myra Saefong, Natural-gas prices aren’t done falling yet, 
MARKETWATCH (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/natural-gas-
prices-arent-done-falling-yet-2015-10-27 [https://perma.cc/JJE2-ZYSD]; Robert 
Scott, Natural Gas Prices Are Falling Significantly, but Why?, MARKETREALIST 
(Nov. 3, 2016), http://marketrealist.com/2016/11/natural-gas-prices-plunging/ 
[https://perma.cc/M8ZZ-NSLV]. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/2
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plants, provide electricity when demand is at its highest.59 Such 
plants, which can be powered up quickly, may operate for only a 
few hours in a given year.60 They typically have lower capital costs 
than base and intermediate load plants, and comparatively higher 
fuel costs.61  
RE generators are something of an outlier on the grid: they 
generally fall outside the first trade-off listed above, between 
providing cheap electricity and maintaining grid reliability, and 
rather implicate the second trade-off, between fossil fuel reliance 
and greenhouse gas emission reductions. RE generator costs are, 
mainly, capital costs: marginal costs, excluding operations and 
maintenance costs, are practically zero.62 The flip side, however, is 
that they produce electricity on an intermittent basis: during times 
of high insolation or wind activity.63 With the exception of biogas,64 
grid operators cannot call upon (dispatch) RE-generated electricity 
at will.65 Due to this intermittency, and owing to high construction 
costs and limitations in the present state of RE technology, RE 
generators have been unable to produce power at the same 
economies of scale as the other generators discussed above. 
Accordingly, RE-generated electricity is both less effective and, in 
the absence of regulation, more costly relative to these other 
generators.  
The competitive electricity market differs from a conventional 
commodities market, where buyers and sellers can interact and 
haggle over price and quantity with each other. Because of the 
nature of electricity, any market transactions conducted more than 
24 hours ahead of generation is deemed long-term planning. 
 
59. See Hogan, supra note 23, at 6. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. Marginal cost dips to the negative, if RE generators benefit from 
production subsidies. See FRANK HUNTOWSKI ET AL., NORTHBRIDGE GRP., NEGATIVE 
ELECTRICITY PRICES AND THE PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT (2002), http://www. 
nbgroup.com/publications/Negative_Electricity_Prices_and_the_Production_Tax
_Credit.pdf [https://perma.cc/PE32-9UWH]. 
63. See Hogan, supra note 23, at 6-7. 
64. Biogas, composed of methane, can be made from burning waste or 
biomass to produce methane, the primary ingredient in natural gas. Id. at 7. 
Biogas can be used in most gas-fired plants, once the methane is sufficiently 
purified. Id. 
65. Id. at 3-7. 
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Within this 24-hour window, transactions in the spot market for 
wholesale electricity are bid-based, and conducted both a day 
ahead, and in real-time chunks of time intervals (of 5 minutes, in 
Ontario66).67 In the day-ahead market, buyers submit offers, and 
generators submit bids based on their short-run marginal-costs68 
for specified quantities of electricity supplied, based on the 
projected demand assumptions. Broadly speaking, these bids are 
accepted in “merit order,” from least to most expensive.69 In the 
real-time market, bids are accepted in merit order, with the price 
of the last (and highest) competitive supply offer accepted setting 
the market-clearing price across the board for a given time 
interval.70  
The wholesale market, in most instances, fails to provide 
adequate revenue to sustain existing generators or incentivize new 
market entrants. This leads to a so-called “missing money” 
problem.71 Further, at the risk of oversimplifying, electricity in the 
wholesale market is procured in a manner that effectively “locks 
in” the conventional structure of the electricity market, with the 
grid operator dispatching low-cost base load plants when demand 
is low, the more expensive intermediate plants when demand rises, 
and the high-cost peaker plants when demand peaks.72 Under a 
FiT or EA regulation, RE-generated electricity is “must take” – the 
spot market absorbs this energy first, before dispatching electricity 
 
66. Id. at 37-38. 
67. Id. at 15. For a more detailed explanation see Market Processes and 
Products, CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATORS, https://www.caiso.com/market/Pages/ 
MarketProcesses.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q39S-74ZM]. There is also a minute-
ahead market, which focuses mainly on the ancillary services on a second to 
second basis. Id. As pricing is not usually implicated on this market, this paper 
does not discuss it in any more detail. 
68. William W. Hogan, A Competitive Electricity Market Model 17 (Oct. 9, 
1993) (draft prepared for Harv. Elec. Pol’y Grp.), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/ 
fs/whogan/transvis.pdf [https://perma.cc/UZE6-8D5W]. 
69. Id. at 17. 
70. Id. 
71. INDEP. ELEC. SYS. OPERATOR (IESO), 2009 ONTARIO MARKET OUTLOOK 9, 
http://www.ieso.ca/Documents/marketReports/OMO-Report-2009.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/7667-W3FF]. 
72. Id. That peak load plants remain switched off until being dispatched, at 
higher rates, keeps costs down and allows them to recoup on these costs upon 
dispatch. Id. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/2
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from conventional generators.73 The consequent drop in required 
load drives wholesale prices down – as the last competitive supply 
offer accepted, which sets the market clearing price, will be lower 
than the price set in the absence of the “must take” RE energy. 
Precisely how RE-generated electricity would fare in wholesale 
markets in the absence of regulation is subject to some debate.74  
C. FiT, RPS and EA regulations 
Regulators worldwide have formulated a panoply of policy and 
regulatory solutions to the “missing money” problem described 
above, which in the absence of regulation would form a barrier to 
entry for electricity generators in general. These solutions typically 
take the form of tax incentives and payment subsidies.75 Tax 
incentives will normally take the form of a production tax, remitted 
on the basis of every kWh of RE electricity generated, and an 
investment tax credit, remitted on the basis of qualifying facility 
installation costs. Payment subsidies will normally be incorporated 
directly into the terms of PPAs of the type discussed in the 
introduction. To increase local buy-in for the resulting government 
expenditure,76 emerging markets in particular have tended to 
combine these subsidies with industrial policy measures, notably 
 
73. As described in Current Energy Markets Discourage Renewable Energy, 
CLEANTECHNICA (Oct. 2, 2015), https://cleantechnica.com/2015/10/02/current-
energy-markets-discourage-renewable-energy [https://perma.cc/MG76-XWVM]. 
Due to low to zero marginal costs, RE electricity generated in compliance with 
RPS regulation obligations is also, in practice, must take for economic reasons. 
Id. 
74. As I will explore in more detail below, the Appellate Body bought the 
argument that wind- and solar-generated electricity would not have existed in 
Ontario, but for government intervention. In other markets, it bears mentioning 
that RE-generated energy is competitive enough to bid in markets. As some of 
these RE generators operate with virtually no marginal costs, further, they are 
able to bid negative energy prices. In some markets in the United States, this has 
resulted in conventional energy generators being driven out of the market, 
although the ability for wind producers to charge negative prices is itself largely 
a function of United States production tax credits. See FRANK HUNTOWSKI ET AL., 
NEGATIVE ELECTRICITY PRICES AND THE PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT 6-9 (2012), 
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/2012/Negative_Electricity_Prices_and
_the_Production_Tax_Credit_0912.pdf [https://perma.cc/34E6-QD9L]. 
75. See, e.g., Michael Hogan, Follow the Missing Money: Ensuring Reliability 
at Least Cost to Consumers in the Transition to a Low-carbon Power System, __ 
ELECTR. J. __, 1-7 (2016). 
76. Literally! 
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local content requirements (known in WTO terminology as import-
substitution measures), which require generators to source a 
percentage of labor and capital costs locally.77 To transition away 
from fossil fuel generators and promote the use of RE in national 
grids, various governments have combined these incentives and 
subsidies with FiT, RPS and EA regulations.78 
As discussed in the introduction, FiT, RPS and EA regulations 
are similar tools with different “entry” points to boost RE energy 
sales. A FiT regulation is a form of price regulation.79 RPS and EA 
regulations, in contrast, are forms of quantity regulation.80 RE 
generators prefer a FiT regulation, as these regulations guarantee 
them a fixed flow of revenue.81 This is particularly important, 
where such generators are seeking to incur debt obligations. EA 
regulations are a second-best solution. Governments will tend to 
prefer FiT or EA regulations where they want to ensure a diverse 
RE supply mix: the concern being that compliance with RPS 
regulations, in particular, will push retailers towards the lowest-
cost RE electricity. Anecdotal evidence suggests that governments 
may find FiT regulations comparatively more stable, given the 
tendency of successful generators in RE auctions to bid too low, 
sometimes leading to a default at the facility construction stage.82 
RPS regulations are the least preferred by RE industry, in light of 
the uncertainties of allowing market forces to determine the 
reasonable price of power under a RPS regulation.83 As a result, 
 
77. See Virginia Hildreth, Renewable Energy Subsidies and the GATT, 14 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 702, 705-09 (2014); Rafael Leal-Arcas & Andrew Filis, Renewable 
Energy Disputes in the World Trade Organization, 13 OIL, GAS & ENERGY L.J. 1, 
45 (2015), https://www.academia.edu/11551752/Renewable_energy_disputes_in_ 
the_World_Trade_Organization [https://perma.cc/N8GS-F3PR]. 
78. WILSON RICKERSON ET AL., UNEP, FEED-IN TARIFFS AS A POLICY 
INSTRUMENT FOR PROMOTING RENEWABLE ENERGIES AND GREEN ECONOMIES IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 10-15 (2012), http://www.unep.org/pdf/UNEP_FIT_ 
Report_2012F.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9QL-WBQT]. 
79. See MAURER & BARROSO, supra note 9, at 78. 
80. Id. at 79-80. 
81. Id. at 133. 
82. Id. at 131. 
83. Which normally leads to investors requiring higher REC prices to 
compensate for the risk. Derya Elyilmaz & Frances Holmans, Uncertainty in 
Renewable Energy Policy: How do Renewable Energy Credit markets and 
Production Tax Credits Affect Decisions to Invest in Renewable Energy?, Paper 
presented at the Agricultural & Applied Economics Associations 2013 AAEA & 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/2
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the required return on equity for these competitive solicitations is 
typically higher than in jurisdictions employing FiT or EA 
regulations.84 In terms of effectiveness, recent empirical studies 
suggest that FiT regulations generate more RE cumulative 
capacity than RPS regulations.85 There are fewer studies 
comparing EA regulations with FiT or RPS regulations. One such 
study found that FiT regulations have generated more value for 
money in Europe than auctions for wind-generated electricity, 
after taking account of differences in wind resource.86 These 
results should however be taken with a grain of salt as, in any 
given jurisdiction, FiT, RPS and EA regulations are offered 
alongside a range of other incentives, notably tax incentives and 
payment subsidies.87 Whether or to what extent a FiT outperforms 
an RPS, or underperforms an EA regulation should be assessed 
against the complete suite of incentives. 
As I will discuss in the following section, these three 
regulations may present some tricky questions of WTO-
consistency. While RPS and EA regulations have not featured in 
either case law or trade law debates thus far, the argument can be 
made that the purchase obligations in a FiT, RPS and EA 
regulation all operate, in effect, as import-substitution measures.88 
Such requirements, as I will discuss in the next section, are 
particularly problematic from a WTO law standpoint.  
 
CAES Joint Annual Meeting (Aug. 4-6, 2013), at 10-11, http://ageconsearch. 
umn.edu/bitstream/150018/2/AAEA%20submissions.pdf [https://perma.cc/TBU6-
KGK6]. 
84. DAVID DE JAGER & MAX RATHMANN, POLICY INSTRUMENT DESIGN TO 
REDUCE FINANCING COSTS IN RENEWABLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PROJECTS ANNEXES 
(2008). Although the authors do not address EAs, presumably, the IRR would be 
comparatively lower with EA prices. 
85. See Dong, supra note 4, at 483. 
86. Lucy Butler & Karsten Nekkuhoff, Comparison of Feed-in Tariff, Quota 
and Auction Mechanisms to Support Wind Power Development 33 RENEWABLE 
ENERGY 1854, 1864-65 (2008). 
87. Indeed, the tax incentives and payment subsidies, cateris paribus, will be 
more valuable in encouraging the entry of RE generators in the short term. 
88. See Rubini, supra note 16, at 553-54. 
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III. WTO LAW 
A. The WTO Secretariat 
The WTO is, essentially, organized around three pillars: 
negotiations, monitoring and dispute settlement. Negotiations 
under the first pillar are held under the auspices of the Trade 
Negotiations Committee (TNC), mandated to negotiate deeper 
market access commitments and binding rules. Monitoring under 
the second pillar is carried out under the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism (TPRM). Dispute settlement under the third pillar is 
formally governed by the Membership acting jointly as the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB).89 There is something of a fluidity to the 
three pillars: Members negotiate new market access commitments. 
These and pre-existing commitments are regularly monitored and, 
where required, enforced by WTO dispute settlement. This 
structure has been reversed lately, with Members seeking to push 
new market access commitments through the backdoor of the third 
pillar.90  
WTO disputes are governed by the Understanding on rules 
and procedures governing the settlement of disputes (DSU) 
annexed to the WTO Agreements.91 WTO disputes are inter-state 
disputes, which are formally initiated at the request of a Member 
(the complainant Member) in respect of any trade-related measure 
adopted or maintained by another Member (the respondent 
Member).92 These Members must first attempt to reach a 
negotiated settlement, failing which the complainant Member may 
request the establishment of a dispute panel, normally composed 
 
89. See William J. Davey, The WTO and Rules-Based Dispute Settlement: 
Historical Evolution, Operational Success, and Future Challenges, 17 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 679, 693 (2014). For a more detailed breakdown of the Secretariats’ work 
within these three pillars, see WTO Secretariats, WORLD TRADE ORG. 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/div_e.htm [https://perma.cc/7V9C-
2JLM]. 
90. This is because the WTO has grown too large for its own good, with 164 
Members unable to decide on new trade disciplines. Note that the second pillar 
operates constantly in the background – through regular committee meetings 
convened by the Secretariat. As such, I do not discuss it any further in this paper. 
91. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]. 
92. See Id. at arts. 1, 2, 3. 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/2
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of three trade diplomats.93 The panel’s final report can be appealed 
to the seven-judge Appellate Body on issues of law or legal 
interpretation.94 A division composed of three Appellate Body 
judges will review a given panel report.95 Nowadays, most panel 
reports are appealed. Dispute settlement proceedings are subject 
to strict time frames, of six months for completion of panel reports 
and 60 days for completion of Appellate Body reports.96 Once the 
findings and conclusions in these reports are formally adopted by 
the DSB,97 the latter may recommend that the respondent Member 
bring its measures into conformity within a reasonable period of 
time.98 Upon expiration of this period of time, the complaining 
Member can, in principle,99 seek to retaliate through 
countermeasures by securing permission – from the DSB – to 
suspend “concessions or other obligations under the covered 
agreements.”100 Such retaliation, which is prospective in nature, 
 
93. Id. art. 8.5. 
94. Id. art. 17.6. Currently, the Appellate Body’s composition is six judges, 
following the United States’ veto of Jennifer Hillman’s reappointment. See Ravi 
Kanth, Is the US Settling Scores with the WTO Appellate Body?, LIVE  MINT (May 
24, 2016), http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/mXEaSbM8h0dSomhueE8ePK/Is-
the-US-settling-scores-with-the-WTO-appellate-body.html [https://perma.cc/HJA 
8-D9MP]. This number may drop to five for some time, following the United 
States’ recent threat to block the reappointment of Seung Wha Chang. Id. 
95. DSU, supra note 91, art. 17. 
96. Id. arts. 12.8, 17.5. 
97. A plenary meeting of the WTO’s membership, essentially wearing a 
different hat. 
98. DSU, supra note 91, arts. 22.1, 22.2. 
99. Where the parties disagree on the level of retaliation proposed by the 
winning Member (which always occurs), the Members will refer the matter to 
WTO arbitration, pursuant to DSU Art. 22.6. Id. art. 22.6. Such proceedings 
should last no more than 60 days. However, in a typical case, the losing 
respondent Member will make cosmetic amendments to the offending measure(s) 
and argue that it has, in fact, complied with the DSB’s recommendations. Where 
the complainant Member disagrees, fresh panel and Appellate Body proceedings, 
if appealed, must follow pursuant to DSU art. 21.5. Id. art. 21.5. The 21.5 
proceedings should ideally be disposed of before 22.6 proceedings are initiated – 
typically by way of so-called “sequencing” agreements owing to some unfortunate 
ambiguity in the DSU on this matter. Id. arts. 21.5 & 22.6. 
100. Id. art. 22.2. 
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may be fixed to a level “equivalent” to the level of economic harm 
caused by the offending measure(s).101  
B. WTO Law 
The WTO General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
and the Agreements on Trade-Related Investment Measures 
(TRIMS) and Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCMs) all 
discipline subsidies.102 Collectively, they draw a distinction 
between production subsidies, which are presumed to be WTO-
compliant, and import-substitution subsidies,103 which are treated 
as something akin to per se violations of WTO law. Below, I address 
the definition of a subsidy in WTO law, the legal basis for 
disciplining production and import-substitution subsidies, the role 
of markets in subsidies disputes, and how these three issues all 
arose in Canada – RE/FiT.  
1. Definition of a Subsidy 
WTO law defines a subsidy as: (1) any form of financial 
contribution104 by a government or private body, where the latter 
is ‘entrusted’ or ‘directed’ by government, whether in the form of (i) 
a direct transfer of funds, (ii) a decision to forego revenue that is 
otherwise due, (iii) the provision of goods and services other than 
 
101. Id. art. 22.4. Such retaliation may target goods other than those subject 
to the dispute, and may implicate the suspension of obligations in other WTO 
Agreements. Id. art. 22.3(b)-(c). 
102. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
401 [hereinafter GATT]; Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 
15, 1994, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA 
[hereinafter TRIMS]; Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter SCMs]. 
103. Both of which are included in my use of the term “payment subsidies” 
in the previous Part of this paper. 
104. SMCs, supra note 102, art. 1.1.The SCMs lists the following forms of 
“financial contribution:” direct transfers of funds (e.g. grants, loans and equity 
infusions); potential direct transfers of funds (e.g. loan guarantees); government 
revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g., tax credits); 
provision of goods or services other than general infrastructure; and purchase of 
goods. Id. 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/2
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general infrastructure,105 or (iv) an income or price support 
scheme106; (2) which confers a “benefit” to the recipient, with 
reference to applicable market benchmarks;107 provided (3) the 
subsidy is “specific,” in that it is limited to a sufficiently narrow 
category of enterprises.108  
2. Production Subsidies 
The GATT codifies the core principle of national treatment, 
which is incorporated, with some variation, in other WTO 
Agreements.109 National treatment prohibits WTO Members from 
treating imported products less favorably than “like” products. 110 
This prohibition applies to any measure adversely affecting 
imported products in law or in fact.111 In determining whether a 
measure adversely affects ‘like’ imported products, a WTO panel 
will typically assess the extent to which the measure at issue has 
modified the “conditions of competition” in favor of the ‘like’ 
domestic product.112 In this context, likeness, is determined with 
 
105. Id. art. 1.1(a)(1). 
106. Id. art. 1.1(a)(2). 
107. Id. art. 1.1(b). 
108. See id. art. 2. 
109. GATT, supra note 102, art. III. 
110. Id. The GATT draws a distinction between “like” products and “directly 
competitive and substitutable” products. This distinction does not appear in other 
WTO Agreements. Id. art. III:b(2); See also General Agreement on Trade In 
Services, art. XVII Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter GATS].The GATS 
draws a distinction between like services and like service suppliers. More 
fundamentally, for purposes of WTO dispute settlement, the GATT’s coverage is 
far more extensive than the GATS, owing to an “agreement to disagree” in 
Uruguay Round negotiations that resulted in the positive listing of GATS 
commitments relative to the negative listing of GATT commitments. Where 
disputes involve hybrid goods, this distinction becomes practically immaterial. Id. 
111. Though the terms “de jure” and “de facto” do not appear in the text of 
art. III, panels have read these into the provision since the days of the GATT 1947. 
For an exhaustive account of this jurisprudence, and alternative approaches to de 
facto discrimination under the GATT, see Lothar Ehring, De Facto Discrimination 
in World Trade Law National and Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment—or Equal 
Treatment?, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 921, 921–977 (2002). 
112. Competition is explicitly mentioned in the Ad Note to GATT Art. III(2) 
as relevant whenever the impact of a measure is assessed against “directly 
competitive and substitutable” imported product. General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade art. III(2), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter 
19
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respect to the following four criteria: (a) product end-uses; (b) 
consumer tastes and preferences; (c) physical characteristics; and 
(d) tariff classifications.113 The TRIMS Agreement, at Article 2, 
clarifies the application of GATT Article III in the domain of trade-
related investment measures.114  
There are two important limitations to national treatment. 
First, national treatment does not apply to government 
procurement, defined as “laws, regulations or requirements 
governing the procurement by governmental agencies of products 
purchased for governmental purposes and not with a view to 
commercial resale.”115 Second, national treatment does not apply 
to production subsidies. The relevant provision of the GATT 
contemplates that nothing in its terms seeks to “prevent the 
payment of subsidies exclusively to domestic producers.”116  
Under the SCMs, such subsidies can be challenged, whether 
unilaterally through countervailing duties or multilaterally 
through WTO dispute settlement, insofar as they cause “adverse 
effects” to a Member State, whether by causing injury to the 
 
GATT 1947]. It has been extended to the Art. III(4) cases by the Appellate Body. 
See Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled 
and Frozen Beef, ¶ 20, WTO Doc. WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (adopted 
Jan. 10, 2001); See also GATS, supra note 64, art. XVII(3). 
113. Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, ¶ 20, 97, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (adopted Nov. 1, 
1996). Under the GATS, likeness is primarily determined with reference to the 
nature and characteristics of the service transactions. See Panel Report, 
European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas, Complaint by Ecuador, WTO Doc. WT/DS27/R/ECU (adopted Sept. 25, 
1997) (as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS27/AB/R, DSR 1997:III, ¶ 
7.322). 
114. Art. 2.1 of the TRIMS Agreement reads: “Without prejudice to other 
rights and obligations under GATT 1994, no Member shall apply any TRIM that 
is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III or Article XI of GATT 1994.” 
TRIMS, supra note 102, art. 2.1. 
115. GATT, supra note 102, art. III:8(a). National-like treatment obligations 
apply depending on whether or not the Member State concerned is (i) a signatory 
to the plurilateral WTO Government Procurement Agreement, and (ii) listed the 
relevant government entity. GPA, Art. III. While all the disputing parties in 
Canada – Renewables/FiT were GPA signatories, Canada had undertaken no 
commitments in relation to the Ontario Power Authority. Canada’s annexes can 
be accessed at Appendices and Annexes to the GPA, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/appendices_e.htm#cane [https://pe 
rma.cc/VV5M-56EB]. 
116. GATT, supra note 102, art. III:8(b). 
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/2
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Member’s domestic industry, displacing or impeding the Member’s 
export penetration in third markets, including the world market, 
or otherwise nullifying or impairing the Member’s legitimate 
market access expectations, where the improved market access 
presumed to flow from a bound tariff reduction is undercut by 
subsidization.117 It bears mentioning, in this context, that the 
GATT “general exceptions” clause,118 which allows respondent 
Members to justify otherwise WTO-inconsistent measures on 
grounds necessary for or relating to environmental protection, 
cannot be raised in the context of the SCMs.119 
3. Import-Substitution Subsidies  
The SCMs specifies two forms of subsidies, export and import-
substitution subsidies, that are prohibited, irrespective of a 
showing of adverse effects.120 Dispute settlement provisions are 
shortened for disputes involving these alleged subsidies.121 Should 
a WTO panel conclude that the challenged measure is indeed a 
prohibited subsidy, the panel must request that “the subsidizing 
Member withdraw the subsidy without delay.”122 Further, 
specificity, the third definitional element of a subsidy, is presumed 
for these prohibited subsidies. Import-substitution subsidies 
effectively cover local content requirements, defined as: “subsidies 
contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, 
upon the use of domestic over imported goods.”123 It is important 
to note that a subsidy is deemed an import-substitution subsidy 
inasmuch as it influences the recipient’s purchasing decisions.124 
Accordingly, and perhaps confusingly, such subsidies can (and 
 
117. SCMs, supra note 102, art. 5. 
118. See GATT, supra note 102. 
119. But see Hildreth, supra note 77, at 720-22. 
120. SCMs, supra note 102, art. 3. 
121. Id. art. 4. 
122. Id. art. 4.7. 
123. Id. art. 3.1(b). Art. 3.1(a) addresses “subsidies contingent, in law or in 
fact, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon export 
performance, including those illustrated in Annex I.” Id. art. 3.1(a). 
124. Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures 19 (Univ. Chi. John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working 
Paper No. 186, 2003), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=1515&context=law_and_economics [https://perma.cc/2ZUQ-BWJ2]. 
21
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often are) conferred to producers.125 The genesis of these two 
prohibited subsidies is unclear. Further, the original GATT treaty 
expressed a permissive attitude towards import-substitution 
subsidies in particular. Be that as it may, in WTO parlance import-
substitution subsidies, in recalibrating domestic purchasers away 
from imports and towards domestic purchases, are deemed to have 
a sufficiently “deleterious effect” on international trade.126  
Juxtaposing the treatment, under WTO law, of production 
subsidies with import-substitution subsidies reveals a striking 
paradoxical feature of international trade regulation: as one 
leading trade authority frames the issue, “a per unit subsidy to all 
domestic buyers of a good can be completely equivalent in its 
effects to an equal per unit subsidy to all domestic sellers – net 
output of domestic producers, net imports, and the net price to 
buyers will be exactly the same under competitive conditions.”127 
Illogical as it may seem, this distinction played out fully in Canada 
– RE/FiT.  
4. Market Definition 
As a practical matter, governments tend to avoid publishing 
information on the size and scope of subsidy programs. This 
presents a challenge for complainants seeking to approximate the 
amount of a subsidy. Such approximation can be useful, where 
complainants wish to seek permission from the DSB to initiate 
adequate countermeasures.128 In addition to being limited to the 
level of economic harm caused by the offending subsidy at issue, 
such countermeasures, importantly, also cannot exceed the 
amount of the subsidy.129 The SCMs directs complainants to 
calculate the benefit conferred by subsidies relative to market 
benchmarks.130 The Appellate Body has previously cautioned, in 
 
125. They do not, for this reason, transform into “production subsidies.” 
126. RAJ BHALA, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 201 (3d ed. 2015). 
127. See Sykes, supra note 124, at 19. 
128. In one decision, a WTO arbitrator authorized a complainant Member to 
retaliate against the respondent Member, the United States, to the tune of the 
value of the subsidy in its entirety. See Decision by the Arbitrator, United States 
– Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations”, ¶ 6.10, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS108/ARB (Aug. 30, 2002). 
129. DSU, supra note 91, art. 22.4. 
130. SCMs, supra note 102, art. 14. 
22https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/2
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respect of such calculations, that “[a] ‘benefit’ does not exist in the 
abstract.”131 Rather, it must be measured against verifiable 
market benchmarks. Such market benchmarks must reflect 
undistorted competition, if they are to give a true picture of the 
quantity of the subsidy.132 Given the discussion of the role of 
governments in shaping electricity markets above, this proved to 
be challenging in Canada – RE/FiT.  
Accordingly, the SCMs directs that government provision of 
capital is measured against the metric of the usual investment 
practices of private investors.133 Similarly, government loans and 
loan guarantees are measured against the amount that the 
recipients would pay to obtain a comparable loan or loan guarantee 
in commercial markets.134 Last, the provision of goods or services, 
and the purchase of goods, by government, are measured in 
relation to market conditions for the goods or services in question 
in the country of provision or purchase.135 Such market conditions 
include, notably, price, quality, availability, marketability, 
transportation, in addition to any other material conditions of 
sale.136  
The calculation of a benefit must ordinarily involve a 
comparison of prices of the subsidized good against the prices of 
‘like’ unsubsidized good in the same market.137 Where the home 
market is competitively distorted, due for instance to the heavy 
hand of government in shaping market conditions, the situation is 
trickier. The Appellate Body has previously allowed complainants 
to use third-country prices for like goods, with necessary 
 
131. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of 
Civilian Aircraft, ¶ 154, WTO Doc. WT/DS70/AB/R (adopted Aug 20, 1999). 
132. Appellate Body Report, Japan – Countervailing Duties on Dynamic 
Random Access Memories from Korea, ¶ 172, WT/DS336/AB/R (adopted Dec. 17, 
2007). 
133. SCMs, supra note 102, art. 14(a). 
134. Id. art. 14(b)-(c). 
135. Id. art. 14(d). 
136. Id. 
137. Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures 
on Certain Products from China, ¶ 2.181, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/AB/R (adopted 
Jan. 16, 2015). 
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adjustments,138 or, where the product in question is a commodity 
good, the world price of the good.139 In Canada – RE/FiT, neither 
the home benchmarks nor permitted alternatives proved 
appropriate to calculate the benefit provided by electricity.  
5. Canada – RE/FiT 
Ontario deregulated electricity prices in 2003.140 That same 
year, the Ontario government announced targets of incorporating 
1350 MW of RE generation into grid by 2007, up to 2700 MW by 
2010.141 To facilitate this task, the government passed legislation 
creating the Ontario Power Authority (OPA), tasked with 
procuring electricity generation in the newly deregulated 
market.142 Ontario enacted two series of laws to incentivize RE 
increased generation, the Renewable Energy Supply (RES) 
initiatives, which it later replaced with the Renewable Energy 
Standard Offer Program (RESOP).143 The RES was solicited, in 
essence, as an energy price auction. Some utility-scale solar 
providers successfully bid for 20-year PPAs with the OPA.144 To 
incentivize smaller-scale generators to enter the market, the 
RESOP took the form of a standard offer, of C$0.11/kWh (non-
solar); C$0.42/kWh (solar).145 Response to the RESOP was tepid, 
particularly from solar PV generators.146 Accordingly, the 
 
138. Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty 
Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, ¶ 89, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS257/AB/R (adopted Feb. 17, 2004). 
139. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of 
Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products – Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of 
the DSU by New Zealand and the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS103/AB/RW2, 
WT/DS113/AB/RW2 (adopted Dec. 20, 2002). 
140. See Hogan, supra note 23, at 28. For a detailed account (though one that 
attributes deregulation as having begun in May 2002), see Michael Trebilcock & 
Roy Hrab, Electricity Restructuring In Ontario, 26 ENERGY J. 123 (2005). 
141. See Hogan, supra note 23, at 31. 
142. Id. at 31. 
143. Id. at 31-34. 
144. Id. at 31-32. 
145. Id. at 33. 
146. JULIE MACARTHUR, EMPOWERING ELECTRICITY: CO-OPERATIVES, 
SUSTAINABILITY, AND POWER SECTOR REFORM IN CANADA 107-108 (2016), https:// 
www.researchgate.net/publication/303876616 [https://perma.cc/5CZL-JNMM] 
24https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/2
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government legislated the Green Energy and Green Economy Act 
of 2009, which directed the OPA to design a FiT regulation.147 
Pricing under the FiT regulation was increased significantly 
from RESOP pricing. RE generators stood to receive payments in 
a range from C$10.3 cents/kWh to C$80.2 cents/kWh: wind projects 
received either C$13.5 cents/kWh (for onshore) or C$19.0 
cents/kWh (for offshore), with some (20%) escalation for inflation, 
whereas solar projects received between C$44.3 cents/kWh to 
C$80.2 cents/kWh (depending on size and technology), with no 
escalation.148 In exchange for these prices, generators were 
required to satisfy so-called “Minimum Required Domestic Content 
Levels” (MRDCL) requirements, requiring them to source labor 
and capital costs, notably electricity generation equipment, from 
the Ontario market.149 The MRDCL for the development and 
construction of wind facilities was 25% from 2009 to 2011, up to 
50% from 2012.150 For solar, the MRDCL was 50% from 2009 to 
2010, up to 60% from 2011.151 For distributive solar under 
Ontario’s so-called “microFiT” regulation, the MRDCL was 40% 
from 2009 to 2010, up to 60% from 2011.152 
Japan and the European Union, suppliers of RE electricity 
generation equipment, called foul and challenged two aspects of 
Ontario’s FiT regulation before a WTO panel: the conditioning of 
eligibility for the FiT and microFiT regulations on the MRDCLs, 
which the complainants characterized as import-substitution 
measures; and the remuneration offered to qualifying RE 
generators under the FiT and microFiT pricing schedules, which 
the complainants mischaracterized as import-substitution 
 
147. See Hogan, supra note 23, ¶¶ 30-34. 
148. See id. ¶¶ 24-25. One important point to note is that these costs are 
passed onto customers, by way of a “Global Adjustment” reflected in customer 
bills, in Ontario’s case. Id. 
149. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Renewables/FiT, supra note 18, ¶ 1.4. 
tbl.1. Distributive solar sold back to the grid by customers is tracked using so-
called “net metering,” a billing mechanism that credits distributive solar system 
owners for the electricity they add to the grid. See Net Metering, SOLAR ENERGY 
INDUS. ASS’N, http://www.seia.org/policy/distributed-solar/net-metering [https:// 
perma.cc/6U7C-V7HP]. 
150. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Renewables/FiT, supra note 18, ¶ 1.4. 
tbl.1. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
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measures.153 The complainants, essentially, sought to link the FiT 
and microFiT pricing to the purchases of the electricity generation 
equipment to establish a relationship between the MRDCLs and 
FiT/microFiT pricing, although it was clear that the latter 
functioned closer to production subsidies. Be that as it may, the 
complainants contended that these MRDCLs violated the GATT 
and TRIMS national treatment obligations.154 Canada, citing the 
government procurement exemption, argued that it was not bound 
by the relevant national treatment obligations.155 
On FiT and microFiT pricing, the complainants contended 
that FiT and microFiT payments exceeded the wholesale (spot 
market) rates charged by the grid operator.156 The complainants 
contended that these spot market rates were appropriate 
benchmarks, for purposes of assessing the “benefit” conferred by 
the measures.157 Canada denied that either program met the 
definitional elements of the WTO subsidy test, having regard to 
the proper benchmarks, which, in Canada’s view, were the rates 
for both wind and solar electricity established through an arm’s-
length transaction between private entities in Ontario.158 Canada 
also seemed to suggest that such rates were reflected in its FiT and 
microFiT pricing, insofar as RE generators would have sought to 
negotiate these rates in the absence of either program.159 
The Appellate Body upheld the panel’s determination that the 
FiT and microFiT regulations fell outside the scope of the 
government procurement exception, and thus violated the national 
treatment obligations, albeit on very different terms.160 The panel 
had found that the exception was unavailable to Canada, having 
 
153. Id. ¶ 5.6. To clarify, the complainants sought to argue that the FiT and 
microFiT regulations, by virtue of their link to MRDCLs, were import-
substitution measures, as distinct from “actionable” subsidies. Presumably, they 
did so owing to the quicker compliance period required of a respondent Member 
when it is found to have conferred prohibited subsidies. 
154. Panel Report, Canada – Renewables/FiT, supra note 23, ¶¶ 7.72, 7.79- 
7.80. 
155. Id. ¶ 7.86(ff). 
156. Id. ¶¶ 7.30, 7.251, 7.255. 
157. Id. ¶¶ 7.253, 7.256. 
158. Id. ¶ 7.259. 
159. Id. ¶ 7.263. 
160. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Renewables/FiT, supra note 18, ¶ 
5.128. 
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regard to the fact that the electricity purchased by OPA was being 
procured “with a view to commercial resale” by reason of the profit 
made by the government on resale of electricity to customers, and 
because such sales were being made in competition with private 
operators.161 Accordingly, the panel found that the MRDCLs 
violated the relevant national treatment provisions.162 An 
important intermediate finding made by the panel, in this regard, 
concerned the link between the electricity generating equipment to 
which the MRDCLs applied, and the electricity which the 
government was actually procuring.163 The panel considered, on 
this point, that there was a sufficiently “close relationship” 
between these two goods.164  
The Appellate Body disagreed with the panel’s analysis, 
focusing instead on the language in the GATT on the government 
procurement exception addressing the “products purchased.”165 
For the Appellate Body, this reference had to be understood in 
relation to GATT Article III’s ‘like’ product analysis.166 
Accordingly, for the derogation to apply, “the product of foreign 
origin [electricity generating equipment] must be in a competitive 
relationship with the product purchased,” electricity.167 In the 
absence of such a competitive relationship the MRDCLs could not 
qualify for the exception.168 
Turning to the FiT and microFiT regulations, the Appellate 
Body upheld the panel’s finding that these constituted financial 
contributions in the form of “government purchases of goods,”169 
 
161. Panel Report, Canada – Renewables/FiT, supra note 23, ¶¶ 7.149-
7.167. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. ¶ 7.127. 
164. Id. Arwel Davies argues that the “sufficiently close” language was not a 
condition, but rather represented obiter dictum for the panel. See Arwel Davies, 
The GATT Article III:8(a) Procurement Derogation and Canada – Renewable 
Energy, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 543, 545 (2015). To support this contention, she points 
to language at paragraph 7.127 suggesting that the contractual relationship 
between the MRDCLS and electricity procurement governed on this issue. Id. 
165. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Renewables/FiT, supra note 18, ¶ 
5.63. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. ¶ 5.74. 
168. Id. ¶ 5.79. 
169. Id. ¶ 5.128. 
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namely electricity, but reversed the panel’s findings that the 
complainants had failed to meet the burden of proof in relation to 
their claim that the FiT and microFiT regulations were prohibited 
subsidies.170 Despite this finding, the Appellate Body would 
declare itself unable to positively resolve the claim (“complete its 
analysis,” in WTO jargon), as the panel had not meaningfully 
analyzed relevant evidence on the record.171 The panel, while 
accepting that both programs involved “government purchases of 
goods” for purposes of the first definitional element of a subsidy 
outlined in the previous subsection, had split 2:1 on the issue of the 
proper benchmark for the second definitional element, concerning 
“benefit.”172 It is instructive to contrast the three approaches taken 
in the Canada – RE/FiT proceedings, as they are all plausible. 
The panel majority considered that the wholesale rates were 
an inappropriate benchmark, as the significant degree of 
government intervention in the market rendered these rates an 
unreliable proxy for competitive counterfactual rates.173 In so 
doing, the majority noted that the use of counterfactual wholesale 
rates would in any event drive RE-generated electricity out of the 
market.174 The majority considered that an appropriate 
benchmark would take into account the particular government 
policies regarding Ontario’s electricity market, including notably: 
(i) the elimination of coal-fired generators by 2014; (ii) the 
resultant need for replacement capacity; and (iii) the need for such 
replacement capacity to come from RE sources.175 Against these 
caveats, the majority considered that an appropriate benchmark 
could be satisfied by  
comparing the terms and conditions of the challenged FIT and 
microFIT Contracts with the terms and conditions that would be 
offered by commercial distributors of electricity acting under a 
government-imposed obligation to acquire electricity from 
generators operating solar PV and wind power plants of a 
 
170. Id. ¶ 5.219. 
171. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Renewables/FiT, supra note 18, ¶ 
5.219. 
172. Id. 
173. Panel Report, Canada – Renewables/FiT, supra note 23, ¶ 7.320. 
174. Id. 
175. Id.  
28https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/2
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comparable scale to those functioning under the FIT 
Programme.176 
The dissent, while agreeing that Ontario’s wholesale rates 
were too distorted to serve as market benchmarks, disagreed with 
the majority’s view that counterfactual wholesale rates were 
inappropriate.177 For the dissent, the government’s policies were 
irrelevant to the question of whether the FiT and microFiT 
participants were receiving remuneration in excess of market 
value. 178 Reviewing the record, however, the dissent agreed with 
the majority that there was insufficient evidence to conduct a 
proper benefit analysis.179  
The Appellate Body considered that the panel majority’s 
market benchmark was overbroad, inasmuch as it considered a 
single market for electricity in Ontario without enquiring into the 
source of the electricity, and conclusory, insofar as the panel’s 
analysis ultimately ended, rather than beginning, with 
identification of what, in the panel’s view, was the correct 
benchmark.180 In the Appellate Body’s view, the panel failed to 
properly consider supply-side factors, notably differences in cost 
structures, operating costs and dispatch characteristics.181 For the 
Appellate Body, the record demonstrated that, while conventional 
electricity generation could exert price constraints on wind and 
solar power, these RE sources could not do the reverse.182 The 
Appellate Body considered that these supply side distinctions were 
 
176. Id. at ¶ 7.322. 
177. Id.; see Part IX. 
178. Id. ¶ 9.3-9.10. At ¶ 9.14, the dissent considered that an appropriate 
benchmark would “(i) represent prices established in competitive wholesale 
electricity markets – that is, wholesale electricity markets that are not 
significantly distorted by government intervention such as that in Ontario; and 
(ii) must be adjusted to reflect the “prevailing market conditions” for electricity in 
Ontario.” 
179. Id. ¶ 9.16 
180. The Appellate Body did not meaningfully address the dissenting 
opinion, probably with good reason – as it seemed based on a misunderstanding 
of the role of governments in electricity markets. 
181. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Renewables/FiT, supra note 18, ¶ 
5.171 (citing Appellate Body Report, European Communities and Certain Member 
States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, 7 ¶ 1121, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS316/AB/R (adopted June 1, 2011)). 
182. Id. ¶ 5.174. 
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such that the markets for wind- and solar-generated electricity 
could only exist because of government regulation.183 In this sense, 
the Ontario government had created a new market for RE-
generated energy. The Appellate Body rounded off its criticism of 
the panel by pointing to the latter’s failure to consider that, while 
customers at the retail level did not differentiate between different 
electricity generated from conventional versus renewable sources, 
the government clearly did for a host of policy reasons.184 
According to the Appellate Body: 
the benefit comparison under Article 1.1(b) should not be 
conducted within the competitive wholesale electricity market as 
a whole, but within competitive markets for wind- and solar PV-
generated electricity, which are created by the government 
definition of the energy supply-mix. . . [such] comparison . . . 
should be with the terms and conditions that would be available 
under market-based conditions for each of these technologies, 
taking the supply-mix as a given. 185  
Having defined what it viewed as the correct benchmark, the 
Appellate Body confirmed the panel’s assessment that Ontario 
benchmarks were unreliable, on account of market-distortive 
government interference.186 Underlining that a government’s 
creation of a market is itself not a bar to the use of market 
benchmarks, the Appellate Body considered that use of out-of-
country benchmarks or constructed benchmarks, adjusted to 
reflect the conditions of the market, would be permissible under 
the circumstances.187 The Appellate Body did so likely knowing full 
well how difficult it would be for the complainants to construct a 
sufficiently robust counterfactual electricity market.188 
In the absence of any remand authority under WTO dispute 
rules, the Appellate Body tries to “complete its analysis” by 
resolving those claims that a panel has incorrectly disposed of. The 
 
183. Id. ¶ 5.175. 
184. Id. ¶ 5.176. 
185. Id. ¶ 5.190. 
186. Id.  
187. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Renewables/FiT, supra note 18, at ¶ 
5.185 (citing Appellate Body Report, US – Lumber IV, supra note 138, ¶ 103). 
188. Id. ¶ 5.190. The complainants, furthermore, had submitted some 
constructed benchmark data to the panel, which the latter had dismissed. 
30https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/2
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Appellate Body does so in recognition that WTO litigation is 
expensive, and time consuming. In this case, the Appellate Body 
attempted to complete the panel’s analysis, relying on data the 
European Union had submitted on wind- and solar-specific pricing 
for Quebec’s FiT to the panel, in addition to price data for an early 
precursor to Ontario’s FiT regulation, the Regulated Price Plan, 
which had preceded Ontario’s deregulation of electricity prices in 
2003.189 Problematically, these benchmarks all related to blended 
electricity markets.190 As the Appellate Body could not bifurcate 
this data between conventional and RE-generated electricity, the 
Appellate Body determined that it was unable to apply this data to 
its benchmark.191 
C. Assessment 
The Appellate Body’s findings, buried beneath layers of trade 
jargon, are of some significance – both in terms of their impact on 
future procurement and subsidization practices in the WTO, and 
in terms of the broader implications for production and import-
subsidization subsidies in energy markets and beyond. I will 
unpack these themes.  
On the one hand, to get at the MRDCL import-substitution 
measures that Canada attempted to cabin under the government 
procurement exception, the Appellate Body unflinchingly stripped 
away at some 70 years worth of Member State practice to narrow 
the scope of this exemption through use of the GATT “like product” 
analysis.192 To illustrate the implications of the Appellate Body’s 
interpretation, I will use the example of a public authority’s 
procurement of a highway pursuant to the United States Buy 
 
189. Id. ¶ 5.192 (citing the relevant portion of the Panel Report).  
190. Id. ¶ 5.180. Surprisingly, the European Union did not put forward a 
strong argument for using German prices as a benchmark. The record suggests 
that the European Union alluded to German prices only in response to a question 
posed by the panel. Id. Although one can only speculate as to the European 
Union’s motivations for doing so, it may be that it felt that German prices as they 
were higher than desired. 
191. Id. ¶ 5.246. 
192. Id. ¶ 6.1(b)(I). The United States’ Buy America Act of 1933, for instance, 
is one of many national laws directing public authorities to give preference to 
locally produced goods for public infrastructure spending. Buy American Act, 41 
U.S.C. § 8301 (2012). 
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America Act.193 Under the Appellate Body’s interpretation of the 
procurement exception, such authority, if procuring [locally 
produced] steel to build a highway, may now be found to violate 
national treatment obligations owed to foreign steel, 
notwithstanding the lack of any “commercial resale” element. This 
is because there is no competitive relationship to speak of between 
the foreign steel being discriminated against, and the highway.194 
Conceivably, the United States could tender thousands of 
individual procurements for the infrastructure project to work 
around this limitation. Even then, a crafty complainant Member 
in a dispute request would have little difficulty arguing that the 
United States was attempting to circumvent this newfound 
limitation to the government procurement exception. 
On the other hand, to cut the FiT and microFiT production 
subsidies some slack, the Appellate Body’s findings on “benefit” 
would seem to allow a Member State to subsidize uncompetitive 
segments of a given market in a manner that alters the given 
supply mix of goods in that market to the point that it has 
effectively created a new market in the subsidized goods. Provided 
the Member State does not pay in excess of the rate of return to 
local producers, the measure may not provide any “benefit” to the 
recipients. I will illustrate the implications of the Appellate Body’s 
interpretation by using the example of ethanol. Assuming that 
ethanol is more efficiently produced from sugar cane than corn, we 
could fathom of a situation where a Member State seeks to ensure 
a given level of corn-based ethanol in its ethanol supply mix – for 
policy reasons we can further assume are valid. Were the Member 
State to provide subsidies sufficient to effectively bifurcate the 
market, a complainant Member would have to show that the 
payments made to the corn producers exceeded their costs of 
production and a reasonable rate of return. The relevant market, 
in such an exercise, would be the market for corn-based ethanol.195  
 
193. 41 U.S.C. § 8301. 
194. See Davies, supra note 164, at 550. Davies suggests that a possible 
refinement is that the exception remains applicable to physical inputs of the good 
being procured, inasmuch as the electricity generating equipment was not a 
physical input to electricity. However, she find this argument to be tenuous, given 
that it elevates form over substance. Id. 
195. Rajib Pal, Has the Appellate Body’s Decision in Canada – Renewable 
Energy/Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program Opened the Door for Production 
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Taking a step back, it is unclear that there were any principled 
differences between the MRDCLs and FiT and microFiT 
regulations. While the MRDCLs explicitly mandated the purchase 
of local content, in the form of electricity generating equipment, 
the FiT and microFiT regulations, in directing OPA to buy RE-
generated electricity [necessarily] nearby the grid, likewise 
afforded preferential access to locally sourced electricity.196 
Although they implicate different products, the former operated as 
a local content requirement in form; while the latter did so in 
substance. Viewed in this light, the Appellate Body’s vastly 
different conclusions seem somewhat anomalous. It bears 
mentioning, in this regard, that the complainants sought to 
highlight the inconsistency apparent in the panel’s finding that the 
MRDCLs had conferred an “advantage” to Canadian industry 
within the wording of the TRIMS,197 vis-à-vis the panel’s failure to 
find that the FiT and microFiT regulations afforded Canadian 
industry any “benefit.”198 The Appellate Body, resorting to the 
Oxford English Dictionary (which it does when seeking to justify 
an otherwise counterintuitive conclusion), found the scope of 
“advantage” to be larger than, and encompassing, “benefit.”199 
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR FIT, RPS AND EA 
REGULATIONS 
Trade scholars speculate that the Appellate Body’s findings on 
market benchmarks were laden with policy considerations. 
Various accounts of the Appellate Body’s purported motivations 
are offered in the literature.200 The most convincing, in my view, 
 
Subsidies? 17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 125, 135-36 (2014). Pal uses the more farcical 
example of subsidies to a Member’s local pineapple industry to drive the point 
home. 
196. See Rubini, supra note 16, at 553. 
197. TRIMS, supra note 102, at annex 1, ¶ 1(a). 
198. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Renewables/FiT, supra note 18, ¶ 
5.205. 
199. Id. ¶ 5.207 (citing Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting 
the Export of Civilian Aircraft, ¶ 1377, WTO Doc. WT/DS70/AB/R (adopted Aug. 
20 1999). 
200. Some, like Luca Rubini speculate that the Appellate Body, like the 
panel majority before it, erred in conflating the question of the existence of a 
subsidy with the question of the justification for the subsidy. See Luca Rubini, 
‘The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly.’ Lessons on Methodology in Legal Analysis 
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suggests that the Appellate Body, while possibly being mindful of 
the broader policy implications of exposing Member Countries’ 
energy markets to challenges, came to an unsurprising conclusion, 
given the partisan nature of dispute settlement proceedings: 
disputing parties tend to concern themselves more with submitting 
benchmarks that, in widening or narrowing net subsidization, best 
 
from the Recent WTO Litigation on Renewable Energy Subsidies, 48(5) J. WORLD 
TRADE 895, 917 (2014). This criticism may well be true. However, it overlooks that 
the SCMs itself draws no meaningful distinction between the existence and 
justification of a subsidy: insofar as a subsidy is found to exist, it matters not that 
a subsidy is “good” in the sense of correcting a market externality, which RE 
subsidies arguably do, and subsidies that are “bad” in the sense of propping up 
failing industries in a manner that distorts world market prices. United States 
and European agricultural subsidies being a prime example of such subsidies. For 
a brief (but clear) discussion of some of the treaty-based alternatives WTO 
Members could have pursued to allow for more “policy space” in the clean energy 
context, see ROBERT HOWSE, SECURING POLICY SPACE FOR CLEAN ENERGY UNDER 
THE SCM AGREEMENT: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES (2013), http://e15initiative.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2015/09/E15-CETs-Howse-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Q5W-
GXRV]. Howse proposes converting import-substitution subsidies for clean energy 
from prohibited to actionable. Once an alleged program is shown to satisfy the 
definitiona l elements of a subsidy, it is countervailable provided it causes some 
form of adverse effects on a complainant. Seen in this light, and against the 
backdrop of the utter collapse of the WTO’s negotiations pillar following the failed 
Doha Development Round of trade negotiations, it is perhaps inevitable that 
panels would attempt to tilt the scales of justice one way or another in a “hard 
case” such as this one. Id. at 4. Others, like Elizabeth Whitsitt, suggest that the 
Appellate Body was mindful of possible tensions with investment law, inasmuch 
as WTO-mandated changes to the FiT and microFiT regulations may have 
resulted in Canada shafting foreign investors. See Elizabeth Whitsitt, A Modest 
Victory at the WTO for Ontario’s FIT Program, 20 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 
75, 99-101 (2013). Whitsitt highlights the Mesa Power litigation as an example of 
less dramatic changes to Ontario’s FiT programs that resulted in arbitral 
proceedings over alleged arbitrary allocation of preferences under the FiT 
following some legislative amendments thereto. See Mesa Power Grp., LLC v. 
Gov’t of Can., PCA Case No. 2012-17 (PCA Case Repository Mar. 24, 2016) 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7240.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/Q87T-U28X]. It bears mentioning that Mesa lost this dispute, on a 2:1 
split. Id. Whitsitt’s argument may also well be true. However, it is difficult to 
know for sure: certainly, nothing on the record indicates that the panel or 
Appellate Body were concerned over the non-WTO law knock-on effects of their 
reports. The international legal order has unquestionably grown fragmented over 
the last three or so decades, and while it would be good of the Appellate Body to 
take an integrationist approach to dispute settlement, the “spaghetti bowl” of 
investment law treaties, numbering in excess of 3000 globally, makes this a 
daunting task. UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2015 - REFORMING 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT GOVERNANCE 115-116 (2015), http://unctad.org/en/ 
PublicationsLibrary/wir2015 _en.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9R3-S27W]. 
34https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/2
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support their arguments, and less with constructing an objectively 
“fair” benchmark.201 In this vein, it is certainly true that WTO 
panels are constrained by the evidence on the record. If the right 
counterfactual does not exist, a panel can do little other than find 
that the complainants have failed to make their case.  
A. Market Definition Matters 
Whatever the reason, it bears mentioning that the Appellate 
Body has never explicitly reversed itself or openly modified its 
prior reasoning on a legal question in its more than 20 years of 
existence.202 Having said this, while the Appellate Body’s 
motivations do not matter, it is nevertheless critically important to 
unpack precisely what the Appellate Body held in Canada – 
RE/FiT. A broad and purposive interpretation of the Canada – 
RE/FiT report might lead one to assess that the Appellate Body 
green-lighted production subsidies, provided these can be 
separated from any accompanying local content requirements. 
Such requirements, by operation of GATT and TRIMS national 
treatment clauses, can be found WTO-inconsistent by a panel even 
where a complainant might now struggle to establish a 
subsidization claim.  
A narrower interpretation would focus on the contours of the 
Appellate Body’s benchmark analysis. Market analyses are not 
novel to WTO litigation – as WTO disputes continue to grow in size 
and complexity, parties have increasingly litigated fact-intensive 
questions of competitive market counterfactuals.203 Further, no 
two markets are the same: what the Appellate Body held in 
relation to the duopolistic world market for large civil aircrafts in 
 
201. Raj Bhala et al., WTO Case Review 2013, 31 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
475, 508-10 (2014). 
202. For an account of more subtle changes to the Appellate Body’s 
methodology see Frieder Roessler, Changes in the Jurisprudence of the WTO 
Appellate Body During the Past Twenty Years (Robert Schuman Ctr. for Advanced 
Studies Resear, Paper No. RSCAS 2015/72, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2673466 [https://perma.cc/6UHJ-JD75]. 
203. Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in 
Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), WTO Doc. WT/DS353/AB/R (adopted 
Mar. 23, 2012); see generally Appellate Body Reports, European Communities and 
Certain Member States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, supra 
note 109. 
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one case will probably not all be applicable to its analysis of the 
world market for cotton in another case, let alone its assessment of 
a provincial electricity market in Canada in yet a different case. 
The Appellate Body’s analysis of the Ontario electricity market, in 
turn, may not color its analysis of, say, the California market in a 
future WTO challenge to California’s RPS regulation, or, for 
instance, the Brazilian market in an analogous challenge to 
Brazil’s EA regulation.204  
In Canada – RE/FiT, the Appellate Body gave more weight to 
differences in supply-side distinctions between conventional and 
RE generators to find that, the similarity of demand-side 
characteristics notwithstanding, these generators supplied 
different markets. Starting with the Appellate Body’s supply-side 
distinctions, it does not necessarily follow that RE-generated 
electricity does not constrain the market behavior of conventional 
generators. I indicated in Part II of this paper that RE-generated 
energy in a FiT regulation, owing to its “must take” characteristics, 
has a price suppressive effect on wholesale electricity prices – on 
the Ontario grid and, presumably, in most other jurisdictions with 
FiT regulations. If the Appellate Body were referring to a 
hypothetical Ontario market, absent the FiT and microFiT 
regulations, its findings would make more sense. Even here, 
however, it will not always be a given that RE-generated electricity 
cannot constrain conventional electricity pricing in the absence of 
a FiT regulation: negative bids from wind-generated energy in the 
Texas wholesale markets, for instance, are reportedly driving 
conventional generators out of the market.205 Further, if we buy 
the Appellate Body’s reasoning on supply-side constraints, one 
could push market segmentation even further: for instance, it 
takes nuclear and coal-fired plants a full day to power up. In a 
competitive market, such plants could not easily react to constrain 
the behavior of gas-fired turbine plants, by ramping up or down. It 
does not necessarily follow that this further splits electricity 
markets between these base and intermediate load plants. In this 
 
204. Both described in INT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY (IRENA) & CLEAN 
ENERGY MINISTERIAL (CEM), RENEWABLE ENERGY AUCTIONS—A GUIDE TO DESIGN 
(2015), http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/IRENA_RE_Auc 
tions_Guide_2015_6_liabilities.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KJU-LD5G]. 
205. See Huntowski, supra note 74, at 6. 
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sense, one could argue that the panel majority’s benchmark was 
more intellectually honest: it openly acknowledged that 
government policy sought to correct environmental externalities, 
and accepted that this policy warranted market segmentation.206 
Turning to the demand-side distinctions, the Appellate Body 
bifurcated the demand-side market between retail and wholesale 
(government) buyers to highlight that there were, in fact, some 
demand-side distinctions between conventional- and RE-generated 
energy. It is indeed true, as I indicated in Part II above, that 
electricity is, physically, identical. Yet, the Appellate Body did not 
need to segment its buyer-side analysis to come to this conclusion: 
customers are increasingly environmentally conscious. To address 
these concerns, electricity distributors have, in recent years, 
marketed a range of green energy tariffs.207 While it is suggested 
in the literature that such tariffs may reflect more of a marketing 
gimmick than a response to consumer tastes,208 this might not hold 
true in energy markets such as California’s, where residents 
proactively require that their electricity come from renewables, 
and are willing to pay higher energy bills. It becomes difficult 
otherwise to explain the overwhelming support for the 50% RPS 
target announced by Governor Jerry Brown on October 7, 2015.209  
Having emphasized that market definition matters for 
prospective respondent Members, it bears emphasizing that 
 
206. Absent such segmentation, one can fathom of a situation where a 
foreign supplier of natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) turbines relies on demand-
side synergies and the lack of pertinent supply-side distinctions to pressure its 
government to initiate a challenge against those states in the United States that 
subsidize their coal generators under a theory that these generators are being 
subsidized relative to gas-fired generators, in a manner that hurts NGCC exports. 
Provided that the benchmark price in such a challenge can be established as the 
wholesale price for electricity, such a challenge could conceivably succeed. 
207. See, e.g., LETHA TAWNEY ET AL., WORLD RES. INST., EMERGING GREEN 
TARIFFS IN U.S. REGULATED ELECTRICITY MARKETS (2016), http://www.wri.org/ 
sites/default/files/Emerging_Green_Tariffs_in_US_Regulated_Electricity_Marke
ts.pdf [https://perma.cc/97X4-C3LF] (listing examples of green energy tariffs 
electricity distributors have marketed). 
208. AMAR BRECKENRIDGE & DAVID FOSTER, A MATTER OF DEFINITION: 
COMMENTARY OF ASPECTS OF THE APPELLATE BODY’S RULING ON THE CANADA-
RENEWABLE ENERGY CASE IN THE WTO 4 (2013) http://worldtradelaw.typepad. 
com/files/fit_definition.pdf [https://perma.cc/UD6Z-BUD9]. 
209. S.B. 350, 2015 Leg., ch. 547, 93 (Cal. 2015), https://leginfo.legislature. 
ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB350 
[https://perma.cc/4ENQ-TYS7]. 
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identifying proper benchmarks will be difficult for prospective 
complainant Members. For one, the Appellate Body may well have 
ruled wholesale electricity prices out as proper benchmarks in any 
future WTO challenge to RE electricity prices in a FiT, RPS or EA 
regulation, given the Appellate Body’s implicit recognition that 
counterfactuals should allow for a reasonable rate of return on 
firms’ capital investments, which marginal cost recovery in the 
spot market does not allow for.210 Such benchmarks would thus 
need to address the “missing money” problem discussed in Part II 
of this paper. This is an eminently reasonable position, and one 
that is aligned with the reality that the electricity market is, quite 
simply, not your typical commodity market.  
In constructing any benchmark prices, it is important to recall 
that there is no such thing as a perfectly competitive electricity 
market – they are all regulated to some degree. This renders any 
constructed electricity market benchmarks arbitrary to some 
degree. Such models, and the assumptions contained therein, are 
sure to be open to various points of attack by experts adduced by 
respondents. One possible point of attack, as I mentioned in Part 
II, is that deregulation initiatives in emerging economies have all 
yielded “dual markets.” Such dual markets are acknowledged in 
the literature as representing rational equilibrium points.211 
Precisely how a prospective complainant Member would construct 
a viable dual market, with solvent private operators and insolvent 
public suppliers, will be interesting to track in future disputes. If 
the arbitrary nature of constructed benchmarks is off-putting 
enough to spur a prospective complainant to first seek to identify 
a real market, the need for proper benchmarks to take supply 
mixes as a given makes life even more difficult: how many 
jurisdictions pursue the same or similar supply mixes?212 And 
 
210. See Appellate Body Report, Canada – Renewables/FiT, supra note 18, 
¶ 5.175. In so doing, the Appellate Body would seem to distance itself from the 
dissent’s view that wholesale market prices could serve as an appropriate 
benchmark. 
211. See HELLER & VICTOR, supra note 34. 
212. Indeed, the Appellate Body acknowledged that such complainants 
would likely have to resort to economic models – which brings us back full circle 
to the problem of arbitrary benchmarks. See Appellate Body Report, Canada – 
Renewables/FiT, supra note 18. 
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within such jurisdictions, how many will operate the same type of 
energy procurement regulation? 
B. FiT v RPS and EA Regulations 
On balance, FiT, RPS and EA regulations, where they lack 
local content requirements, are now relatively insulated from WTO 
challenges. Where a respondent Member is challenged on FiT 
pricing, it may now argue, in line with the Appellate Body’s 
findings in Canada – RE/FiT, that its interventions in the market, 
spurred by pro-environment policies or considerations, have led to 
the creation of a new market for RE-generated energy. 
Accordingly, its FiT pricing should be assessed against 
hypothetically competitive RE-generated electricity prices, subject 
to the “terms and conditions that would be available under market-
based conditions for each of these technologies, taking the supply-
mix as a given”213 This not only adds a layer of complexity for a 
complainant Member: it invariably raises counterfactual prices.  
RPS and EA regulations are even more insulated from a WTO 
challenge. Before a complainant Member can even tackle the 
complexities of establishing an appropriate benchmark to show the 
existence of any benefit to recipients, it need first show, in 
subsidies challenge to an RPS regulation, that such regulation 
resulted in a “financial contribution.” The same considerations 
that led the panel in Canada – RE/FiT to find that the Ontario 
government was purchasing goods, are arguably lacking in an RPS 
regulation214 while publicly-owned utilities may be covered by RPS 
obligations, they apply with equal force to IOUs. While the 
argument can be made that such private bodies are being 
‘entrusted’ or ‘directed’ to purchase electricity by the government, 
it bears mentioning that the Appellate Body has never upheld any 
findings under this definitional provision, preferring instead to 
broaden the scope of a “public body” than opening the Pandora’s 
Box of bringing private party action within the purview of SCMs 
litigation.215 Assuming, arguendo, that a complainant establishes 
 
213. Id. ¶ 5.190. 
214. An EA regulation would feature a government purchaser. 
215. The Appellate Body has made various obiter remarks on SCMs article 
1.1(a)(iv), notably alluding to its anti-circumvention purposes, without ever 
positively finding any instances of entrustment or direction in appeals to date. 
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a financial contribution; with respect to an RPS regulation, where 
the only or predominant purchasers in a market are public bodies; 
and with respect to an EA regulation for that very reason, it will 
still have to establish that the prices negotiated with RE 
generators are supra competitive. As RPS and EA regulations are 
designed to be market-driven, this is a tall order to meet.  
Canada – RE/FiT thus sets an encouraging precedent for 
governments (as respondents) and RE industries. Prior to the 
dispute, cautious governments may have preferred implementing 
RPS or EA regulations to FiT regulations, on the understanding 
that the former two are less likely to be found trade distortive than 
the latter. Following Canada – RE/FiT, these governments – 
insofar as they can afford it – can safely provide FiT regulations 
safe in the knowledge that they are, to some degree, insulated from 
a WTO challenge.216 I qualify the statement with “to some degree” 
as, paradoxically, it would seem that they fall into a certain ‘safe 
harbor’ if they can sufficiently distort the electricity market to the 
point where it may be shown, objectively, that a new market for 
RE-generated electricity has been created. Governments that are 
unable to do so might still be exposed to wholesale electricity 
benchmark prices, although such prices might have to be adjusted 
to reflect reasonable rates of return. The need to sufficiently distort 
a market would seem to privilege developed Member States with 
deeper pockets than developing Member States, although the 
counter-argument can certainly be made that some level of 
subsidization of RE-generated electricity, falling short of creating 
a new market, is less likely to cause a given respondent Member’s 
trading partners any adverse effects of the type normally required 
before a complainant Member can seek to impose countermeasures 
in the first place.  
V. CONCLUSION 
RE-generated electricity is a critically important component of 
states’ commitment, under the UNFCC Paris Accord, to curb 
 
See generally, on the anti-circumvention purposes, Appellate Body Report, US – 
Softwood Lumber IV, supra note 88, ¶ 52. 
216. See Appellate Body Report, Canada – Renewables/FiT, supra note 18. 
In practice, countries are increasingly viewing EA regulations as a more cost-
effective alternative to FiT regulations. 
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anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions to below disastrous levels 
in the course of the next century. The WTO’s 164 Member States 
will all have to deliver on this commitment, if the world is to avoid 
some of the gloomier projections of a world that has warmed by in 
excess of 2 degrees Celsius from present-day average global 
temperatures. The WTO and its Secretariat staff are fully aware 
of this.217 The importance of sustainably incorporating RE 
generators onto national grids by Members, in this regard, cannot 
be understated.  
Electricity markets are all, more or less, reaching an inflection 
point, where regulators are revisiting ways to best incorporate RE-
generated energy on wholesale electricity markets. This is a task 
that, amongst other things, must result in a level playing field 
between conventional and RE generators. Conventional generators 
in certain markets have enjoyed embedded privileges. In the 
United States, for instance, many utilities have fully amortized 
their facilities equipment, and are much better placed to absorb 
marginal cost pricing when bidding in spot markets than new 
market entrants. RE generators, as new entrants to the market, in 
turn cannot compete with conventional generators without 
government support. They are most vulnerable to the “missing 
money” problem.  
Government support to remedy this problem has, typically, 
come in the form of FiT, RPS or EA regulations, requiring public 
bodies and encouraging private bodies to enter into long-term 
PPAs with RE generators at contract rates sufficiently attractive 
to allow investors a reasonable rate of return. These programs are 
sometimes reinforced with various other types of incentives, 
notably tax incentives and payment subsidies, some of which 
incorporate local content requirements. Such incentives may raise 
issues under the WTO GATT, TRIMS and SCMs Agreements.  
Local content requirements are simply not tolerated under 
WTO law. Production subsidies, on the other hand, are fine in 
principle. Before Canada – RE/FiT, it was understood that 
production subsidies were actionable by prospective complainant 
Members, where they cause adverse effects. In Canada – RE/FiT, 
the Appellate Body tightened disciplines relating to permissible 
 
217. It bears mentioning that WTO HQ in Geneva is resourced with state of 
the art recycling facilities! 
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government procurement, but loosened disciplines relating to 
production subsidies.  
The Appellate Body, in its benchmark analysis of the Ontario 
market, has created a safe harbor for RE production subsidies, in 
introducing a significant evidentiary hurdle for complainants to 
cross if they are to succeed in any challenge to production 
subsidies. Such complainants will have to show that RE generators 
are being remunerated in excess of whatever rates, inclusive of a 
reasonable rate of return, would prevail in the RE electricity 
segment of the market (a separate and newly created market), 
taking the allegedly subsidizing Member’s supply mix as a given. 
The need to scour through potentially confidential company-level 
financial data to obtain the requisite rate of return information to 
calculate market benchmarks, let alone the complexities involved 
in constructing such benchmarks, makes it less likely that 
Members will challenge each other’s electricity markets in the 
future. 
Scholars disagree on the Appellate Body’s motivations. 
Further, its market analysis probably had some economists 
seething with rage. Ultimately, none of these aspects matter: only 
the Appellate Body’s holding matters. The takeaway from this is 
that FiT, RPS and EA regulations are now insulated from a WTO 
challenge. One implication is that, inasmuch as cautious 
governments preferred RPS or EA regulations for fear of having a 
FiT characterized as a subsidy, such Member States will be 
released of those fears. It is doubtful that Canada – RE/FiT will 
lead to an onslaught of FiTs, given the considerable costs to 
consumers they entail. Further, anecdotal evidence indicates that 
countries, particularly in Latin America, are increasingly 
preferring EA regulations to FiT regulations.218 It may well be that 
developing countries will instead be more emboldened to enact 
aggressive EA regulations, safe from the possibility of a WTO 
challenge. 
Whatever the energy procurement regulation chosen, provided 
such Members can show that they are supporting RE-generated 
electricity through them for environmental purposes, and that, 
 
218. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, RENEWABLE POLICY UPDATED 2-4 (2016), https:// 
www.iea.org/media/pams/repolicyupdate/REDRenewablePolicyUpdateNo920160
405.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2T4-GX2J]. But see text at note 45. 
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absent such support, RE generators could not compete in the 
wholesale market for electricity (something that the historical 
development of electricity markets fully supports), they are free to 
remunerate RE generators well in excess of these wholesale 
market prices. This is a significant development for energy 
markets, and one that may well spur governments to experiment 
with bolder RE subsidies in the future, with a view to testing the 
bounds or upper limits of the Appellate Body’s findings in Canada 
– RE/FiT. There are definitely fast times ahead for RE generators, 
energy regulators, their governments, and their trading partners.  
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